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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-------------- -------------- ------------SHERMAN G. ANDREW,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

Case No. 15,145

GORDON B. SWAPP, dba SWAPP
REAL ESTATE COMPANY and
LEONARD M. STILLMAN, dba
STILLMAN CONSTRUCTION;
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, a
Corporation,
DefendantRespondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant,
Gordon B. Swapp, as the owner, seller and builder of a home in
Provo, Utah.

The action was based upon an alleged Uniform

Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase.

The plaintiff

claime<l that the respondent failed to complete his agreement
according to the terms of the alleged Uniform Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was tried before the Honorable Allen
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

Sorensen,

County,

in

the

Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah

sitting without a

as against

the defendant Stillman and was heard as
The

dant Swapp.

Court

found

that

contract upon which plaintiff
to

The complaint was dismissej

jury.

the plaintiff

out

there was

no enforceable

could recover but did award

of equity

the

damages and $10.00 nominal damages
costs in the sum of

to defen-

sum of

$635.00 special

together with Court

$74.60.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

It is
ment of the

the position of

the respondent

trial court should be affirmed and

be awarded his costs and attorney's
ing to

this

fees

that

the judg-

that responder•

incurred in respond-

appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Sometime in the spring of 1974, March
of

that year,

office of

the

the appellant,
respondent,

the respondent had
Mr.

Andrew;

for him on a

Sherman Andrew,

Gordon Swapp,

and

recently completed a

and he wanted
lot owned by

to know if a
the

home

through Mav

came into the
indicated that
for

a

friend of

home could be built

respondent

in the Provo area.

Discussion was had between the parties with

regard
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to down

payment and
cated
h11t

the possible cost of

the home.

Mr.

Andrew indi-

that he did not have enough money for a down payment

what he proposed

cheaply enough
80% to

90% of

payment.
against

in the two figures

Swapp explained

law;

In order for

Swapp build

the home

to get a high appraisal so that he could use
the difference

Mr.
the

to do was have Mr.

that

and

for his down

to him that this was strictly

in his opinion,

it could not be done.

to be accomplished,

Mr.

Swapp would have

to certify that the appraisal price was also the sales price
which Mr.

Swapp was not willing to do.
Over

the next two to three months, Andrew was in

Swapp's office almost weekly until finally Mr.
cated

that he would build a house on a lot owned by Mr.

and when the home was
a down payment
of

the home,

that a

four

structed.
floorplan
pick the

finished,

to secure a

Mr.

inquired what

for

Andrew could raise

Mr.

type of a house was to be built.

Mr.

Andrew

Swapp said

two car garage was to be con-

Andrew asked if two changes in the regular
him could be made and also if Mr.

color of brick,

paint etc.
that

Mr.

the loan for

Andrew could

Swapp agreed to

the color of the brick would be

compatible with what others would want if Mr.
get

Swapp;

loan and pay the purchase price

level split with a
Mr.

and if Mr.

Swapp would sell the home to him.

those requests provided

not

Swapp indi-

the purchase of

Andrew could

the property.

There
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was a verbal agreement between the parties as
tion.

Thereafter,

Mr.

and Loan in Provo and
loan for

the

to Deseret Federal Savings

the home

in question.

Deseret

to him that he had seven loans on spec

in process and that

obtain another loan.
Mr.

that condi-

inquired concerning another construct\,-

construction of

Federal indicated
homes

Swapp went

to

they were reluctant

However,

they did

indicate that if

Swapp had one pre-sold or one or two of

construction were sold,

to let him

the homes under

they would go ahead and allow the

constructi.:in of

the home discussed between Andrew and Swapp.

Swapp explained

to Deseret Federal what Andrew's proposal

was and what Mr.

Swapp was willing

to do.

Deseret Federal

indicated that

if Mr.

Mr.

interested in purchasing the home

Andrew was

Swapp could show some evidence that

would go along with the financing
Mr.

Swapp contacted Mr.

come into his office wherein Mr.

for Mr.

Swapp.

Andrew and asked him to
Swapp explained the problem ,

to him indicating that if he wanted
Agreement showing that he wanted

that they

to sign an Earnest Money

to buy

the home, Mr. Swapp

would see if Deseret Federal would let him start on the home
with out the financing by Mr.
that inasmuch as
be on the home

they

Andrew.

Mr.

did not know what

Swapp also explaicC:

the final price wouli

to be constructed they would use the apprais 3-

figure and make the adjustment later as

to

the ultimate pdci
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He also explained
money down and
wait

until

establish

to Mr.

that

the details on financing would have to

the

final

price.

Agreement was

into

taken

1974, was prepared.

to

Swapp.

When

they indicated to

that as a practical matter the agreement had no
them;

but if Mr.

Swapp would have Mr.

Andrew come

the office and make an application for a loan and give

issue

to Mr.

Swapp

During

tion of
which

the

time that the home was under the early
Andrew was constantly on the job

the workman there and interfering with the construc-

the home.

the

Mr.

Swapp agreed to make the two changes

parties had originally talked of.

other changes were made by Mr.
of the

contractor or Mr.
in being able

Andrew's

they would

for $29,600,00.

stages of construction, Mr.
harassing

Andrew's credit,

the construction loan, which was ultimately

issued on June 17, 1974,

tion.

The Earnest Money

to Deseret Federal by Mr.

them opportunity to check Mr.

enced

Andrew agreed to this and,

Federal obtained the agreement,

Swapp

value

Mr.

the Earnest Money Agreement in question in this

matter dated June 4,

Mr.

take any

the home was nearing completion so they could

thereafter,

Deseret

Andrew that he could not

Andrew without

Swapp.

to comolete

However, many
the consent

Many of the problems experithe home were caused by Mr.

constant interference during the period of construc-

Mr.

Swapp

found

that change after change was being
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made or requested by Mr.
Mr.

Mr.

Swapp.

Andrew which was never okayed by

Swapp ran out of money and had

1975, Mr.

Swapp asked the Andrews

into his office as he desired
Mr.

chase of the home.

increase

In January or

the construction loan to $31,500.00.
part of February,

to

the ear'
to come

to discuss with them the pur-

Swapp found

that Mr.

Andrew had never

applied for a loan and had made changes in the home totaling
several thousand dollars.

Mr.

Swapp advised Mr.

the difficulties

in construction,

the home,

the changes involved,

and of

Andrew of

of his interference with
and also advised him

of the increased costs in the construction of the home.
April 9,

1975, Mr.

On

Swapp again ran out of money in construe-

ting the home and increased the construction loan to

$38,~00.

The total amount on the home was due and payable on or before
September 1, 1975.
months from the
parties and

During the period of approximately 18

time of the initial discussion between the

the time the home was

Deseret Federal Saving and Loan,

foreclosed against by
Andrew never applied for

a loan as he promised he would.
No money was ever received from the appellant and
no contract was ever signed by the parties with regard to
the ultimate construction of the home,
The Court's

findings

able contract and

that

that

completion date, etc·

there was not,

in fact,

an enforce·

the only recovery allowed by Andre•

-6-
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against Swapp was based upon equity should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
EVEN WHEN THE PROCEEDINGS TO BE REVIEW ARE
IN EQUITY, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND
JUDGMENT ARE PRESUMED CORRECT AND SHOULD
BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO
THE RESPONDENT

The relief prayed for by the respondent herein
is based upon equity.
Constitution allows
of law and fact
241,

Article VIII,

the Supreme Court to review questions

in equity cases.

147 P.2d 853

Section 9 of the Utah

(1944).

Crockett v. Nish, 106 Utah

In an appropriate case,

this court

can substitute its judgment for that of the trial court,
Mitchell v.

Mitchell,

527 P.2d,1359

(Utah 1974), but it has

been made abundantly clear that this does not amount to a
trial de novo on the merits.

The appellant has

the burden

of proving by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the
trial court's

findings

and judgment are erroneous.

The

Supreme Court will review the evidence and all inferences
fairly

to be drawn

the trial court's

therefrom in the light most favorable
findings and judgment.

Daughters Investment Co.,
As
Utah2d

286,

29 Utah2d 421,

Olsen v.

Park

511 P.2d 145 (1973).

the Court stated in Del Porto v.
495 P.2d 811

to

Nicolo,

27

(1972):

-7-
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It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this
action to avoid deeds is one in equity upon
which this court has both the prerogative and
the duty to review and weigh
the evidence,
and to determine the facts.
However, in
the practical application of that rule, it
is well established in our decisional law
that due to the advantaged position of the
trial court, in close proximity to the parties
and witnesses, there is indulged a presumption of correctness of his findings and
judgment, with the burden upon the appellant
to show they were in error; and where the
evidence is in conflict we do not upset his
findings merely because we may have reviewed
the matter differently, but do so only if the
evidence clearly preponderates against them.
It is the position of
ruling of

the

this respondent

that the

trial court should not be disturbed and that

the standard of review should be adhered
The language in the case of Nielson v.
511 (Utah 1976)

to in this case.

Rasmussen,

558 P.2d

is applicable in the case before the court:

This court will not disturb the trial court
in its findings unless we say as a matter of
law that no one could reasonably find as that
trial court did.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING IS CORRECT THAT
NO LEGAL AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT EXISTED
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

One of

the

first principles of contract law is tha:

there be a mutuality of assent in the formation of a contrac:.
The principle is fundamental that a party
cannot be held to have contracted if there

-8-
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was no assent, and this is so both as to
express contracts and contracts implied
in fact.
There must be mutual assent or
a meeting of the minds on all essential
elements or terms in order to form a
binding contract.
(F)or a contract to be binding, the parties
thereto must have a distinct and common
intention which is communicated by each
party to the other.
17 Am Jur 2d 354-355
Contracts §18.
'
The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed this principle
on many occasions.
P.2d 695

(1976)

In Morgan v.

Board of State Lands,

549

the court stated:

In order to find any contract,.
.it is
essential that it appear there was an
express or implied meeting of the minds
of the parties on the agreement.
Also,

in E.B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle,

103 Utah 554, 137 P.2d 342,

the court stated that "The 'mutual assent'

essential to a

contract requires assent by all parties to the same thing in
the same sense,

so that their minds meet as to all the terms."

The court indicated in its finding that the plaintiff was

entitled to recover against the defendant Gordon

Swapp out of equity only.

At the trial of the case,

the

burden was upon the appellant to prove the matters presented
to the court.
cient
tiff

The court found

that "The only evidence suffi-

to carry plaintiff's burden,

thereby allowing the plain-

to recover judgment against the defendant, Gordon B.

Swapp,.

" was on the basis of equity rather than contract.
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The

trial court's finding

tract was

there was not a

in accordance with all of

the

fully integrated agreement

binding con-

testimony placed

The Earnest Money Agreement

before it.
a

that

in question was not

incorporating all of

and conditions which the parties had discussed.
instance,

it was merely a

parties.

In the case of Erickson v.

102 P.2d 310

(1940),

written contract

is

the terms upon which
Inasmuch as

the terms
In this

tool used in negotiations by the
Bastian,

the court stated that
to put

98 Utah 587,

the purpose of a

in definite and evidentiary form

the minds of the parties have met.

the minds of the parties herein did not meet as

to all of the terms,

and since

the complete

terms were never

incorporated into the proposed Earnest Money Agreement, the
document which appellant claims is a
nite and evidentiary form of

the

contract is not a defi-

terms about which the parti<'

should have agreed.
The trial court was correct in concluding that the
parties had not reached an agreement which was definite,
It is obvious from

enforceable and in an evidentiary form.
the

testimony given

intention of
ment as

the parties

trial court

13 Utah2d 83,

that

it was never the

to rely upon the Earnest Money Agree·

the ultimate contract for

which respondent was
Bills,

to the

constructing.
368 P. 2d 597

the purchase of
The
(1962)

the home

court in Bunnell'!..:stated

that a bind·
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ing contract can exist only where there has been mutual assent
by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its
In the case in chief, neither party intended to be

terms.

bound by the total and complete terms of the proposed Earnest
Money document.

Furthermore,

in the Bunnell case,

the court

asked two pertinent questions which should be asked in the
present case.

First, "Is there substantial evidence to sup-

port the trial court's finding that the defendant had manifested an intention to be bound by the terms that were offered
by the plaintiff?";

and second,

"And if so, in light of the

circumstances under which the agreement was entered, can the
intention of
tainty?"

the parties be ascertained with reasonable cer-

In the instant case,

the trial court answered both

of these questions in the negative.

That finding should not

be disturbed.
"The creation of a contract requires a meeting of
the minds of the parties;

the burden of so proving is on the

party who claims there is a contract."
Bringhurst,

29 Utah2d 442,

evidence before the

B&R Supply Co. v.

503 P.2d 1216 (1972).

trial court,

From the

the court could not conclude

that there had been a meeting of the minds.

The court in

its findings specifically states that the appellant had
failed

to meet its burden by way of proof.

In addition to

the difficulties with regard to the requirement of a meeting
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of the minds,
does not

the proposed agreement is ambiguous since it

include details as to financing,

completion dates,

etc.
Where the offerer, using ambiguous language, reasonably means one thing, and
the off eree reasonably understands differently, there is no contract.
17 Am Jur
2d 358, Contracts §22.
In the case before the court,
only ambiguous but fails

the proposed contract is not

to specify many of the terms and

conditions required to meet the requirements for a written
In Paulsen v.

agreement.
49 (1953),

Coombs,

253 P.2d 621,

123 Utah

the court said that the principle of preserving

the sanctity of a written contract only applies when the
contract represents the intent of the parties.

The court

has on many instances stated that in interpreting a contract,
the objective is to determine what
the

time the document was executed.

Utah2d

204,

398 P.2d 207

the parties intended at
Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16

(1964).

In ascertaining the meaning of
tract,

the words in a con-

the intention of the parties is controlling;

it is susceptible to different interpretations,
ous evidence is admissible to show intention.
Robinson's Medical Mart Inc.,
(1966).

and where

the extrane·

Bennett v.

18 Utah2d 186, 417 P.2<l 761

In the document in question,

of the parties and the intention of

the

interpretation

thl' appell;int and resron-
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dent

cannot be specifically ascertained without reference

to other evidence.
An examination of the document in question presents
a patent ambiguity in the document itself as it is drawn.
The Agreement is but a cursory outline of vague negotiations
made by the parties.

There is no specific date of completion,

no specific form of financing,
price of
exists,

and merely an appraisal of the

the home yet to be built.

Since such ambiguity

parol evidence should be admitted to show the inten-

tion of the parties,
The intention of the parties to a written
contract must ordinarily be determined by
an examination of the writing, but if it
is ambiguous and the intention of the parties
cannot be determined from the writings itself,
parol evidence is admissible to show such
intention,
Milford State Bank v. West Field
Canal and Irrigation Co., 108 Utah 528, 162
P.2d 101.
Finally,

it may be said that ambiguity, such as exists in the

Earnest Money Agreement proposed by the appellant herein,
allows the court to took to the total circumstances involved
in the case to determine the intent of the two parties.

~

S. Ludlow Investment Co. v. Salt Lake County, 28 Utah2d 139,
499 P.2d

283

(1972).

It is a fact that no money exchanged hands between
the appellant and respondent with regard to an Earnest Money
payment.

Therefore,

no good and valuable consideration existed
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for

the formation of

the contract.

give legal consideration to
Horne,

557 P.2d 154

(1976),

The plaintiff did not

the defendant.

In Gasser v.

the court stated that

the prin-

cipal must be bound to give some legal consideration to the
other party by conferring a benefit upon them or by suffering
a legal detriment at their request.

No legal consideration

nor detriment was proved to have been given by the appellant
in the case at hand.
Finally,
4,

found

the court in its Finding of Fact, No.

that:
.plaintiff is entitled to recover
against the defendant as stated herein
on the basis of unjust enrichment and
equity only.
The Court, therefore, finds
that the plaintiff is not entitled to an
award of attorney's fees inasmuch as the
Court finds that no recovery is allowed
the plaintiff on the basis of contract.

In addition thereto,

the

trial court refused evidence on

this matter on petition since the plaintiff neglected to
place such evidence as there might have been before the court
at

the proper time.

The plaintiff claimed that the contract

expressly called for an attorney's fee.
established that

However,

there is no contract in fact,

can be no award of attorney's fee.
contract were held

has held that attorney's fees

then there

Furthermore,

to be in existence,

if it is

even if a

the Utah Supreme Cour:

are awardable only if express)·:

contracted for or provided by statute and if

there is eviden ..
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as to the necessity and the reasonableness of such fees.
Walker v.

Sandwick,

ings

the award to the plaintiff was based upon equity

that

548 P.2d 1273

(1976).

The court's find-

only and not upon contact is sufficient to allow the matter
to be resolved on appeal in favor of the respondent.

CONCLUSION

It is,

therefore,

the trial court's findings
that

this

the position of respondent that
and conclusions should be affirmed;

court should conclude that no contract existed

between the parties upon which the trial court could legally
act in favor of the appellant;
it appears,

and in light of the record as

that respondent should be awarded his costs and

fees in connection with this

~ppeal.

Respectfully submitted,

,!L.JJ$'fi

~G
AND WILSON
Attorneys for Respondent
84 East 100 South
Provo, UT
84601
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